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  This thesis argues that the root cause of both climate change and the decline of democracy 
in the West is neoliberalism’s pervasive marginalization of faith in public action. It responds to the election of 
Donald Trump by critically analyzing how noted democratic theorist Sheldon Wolin interpreted the election 
of Ronald Reagan and the lessons to be learned from it. It argues that Wolin is right to ascribe great 
importance to historical memory in democratic citizenship, but wrong to highlight localism as the primary 
venue for contestation, especially in the context of global climate change. The antidote to these problems, 
then, is to reinvigorate people’s faith in public planning by forcefully reasserting the role of the state in areas 
where the interests of capital are most clearly incompatible with the general welfare. It proposes 
nationalizing the fossil fuel industry as an example of a policy that would fulfill these needs. 
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I. Introduction 
…the most significant political fact about contemporary American life: the 
steady transformation of America into an antidemocratic society. — Sheldon 
Wolin 
There is a light and it never goes out. — The Smiths 
 The contemporary climate situation is grim. The Paris Agreement’s target 
of limiting the rise in global temperatures to 2 degrees Celsius is now out of 
reach due to the U.S’s insufficiently stringent policies to minimize carbon 
emissions.1 
 At the same time, there seems to have been a decline in the role of 
democracy in the West. In part, the rise of Donald Trump was due to the 
massive epistemic failure of the professional class to see his victory as his 
possibility. This has a disturbing parallel in climate change’s unique agony in 
its tendency to play into people’s worst psychological blind spots regarding time 
discounting and processing future impacts.2 One of the implication with that 
while climate change is an issue that requires paying close attention to the 
news, it can at times feel like standing in between the iron of a train track and 
seeing the first railcar come slowly but surely towards you and being paralyzed. 
The slow drip of bad news continually takes new and increasingly disturbing 
forms. The most recent iteration of this process has been the reports regarding 
the distressing loss of Arctic sea ice.3 
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 The core position being argued for is that the marginalization of 
democratic elements in the West has been in parallel with the increasing 
difficulties climate change has posed for governing structures. In particular, 
both of these are, at their core, symptoms of the capitalist system. By 
capitalism I refer to: 
an indirect system of governance based on a complex and continually 
evolving political bargain in which private actors are empowered by a 
political authority to own and control the use of property for private gain 
subject to a set of laws and regulations.4 
 This definition is useful in several ways. Firstly, it highlights the 
necessity for other institutions to prop up market structures. Markets are not 
“natural” as is often alleged, but instead evolve and are insured by non-market 
institutions. Second, that it captures the centrality of political institutions in 
maintaining capitalism as a functioning economic order and that it isolates the 
private (meaning without consideration for public needs) nature of actions 
undertaken within it. It is the last part of this formulation that is crucial to my 
arguments regarding the relationship between capitalism and climate change: 
the drive for private accumulation puts the desire for constant expansion into 
necessary conflict with ecological limits. This is why my argument is that the 
proper remedy for this fundamental disconnect is strong state intervention. 
 It is also useful, especially as it relates to solutions to climate change, to 
reference neoliberalism. This term has been maligned as of late for being 
hopelessly vague and functioning as a sort of catch-all for criticisms of 
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modernity.5 The discussion of the impact of carbon markets will show that 
neoliberalism is a useful descriptive term to describe the frame of policy 
consideration. It refers, by my reading, to an unrelenting faith in markets. But 
my understanding of neoliberalism is notably similar to Wendy Brown’s, who 
emphasizes the way that governing processes influence social formation: 
…neoliberalism carries a social analysis that, when deployed as a form of 
governmentality, reaches from the soul of the citizen-subject to education 
policy to practices of empire. Neoliberal rationality, while foregrounding 
the market, is not only or even primarily focused on the economy; it 
involves extending and disseminating market values to all institutions 
and social action, even as the market itself remains a distinctive player.6 
 Note that whereas some definitions of neoliberalism emphasize its 
economic policies (free trade, labor market deregulation), the distinction 
between it and prior forms of liberalism come from the usage of the state to 
promote market-driven ends. The traditional liberal division between public 
and private spheres is upended as no space for non-economic evaluation is 
allowed. My understanding of democracy here is in line with the standard 
reading for theorists in Sheldon Wolin’s sphere of influence: popular rule.7 
 The Marxist argument for capitalism as the source of climate change is 
relevant here. Climate change comes first and foremost as an impact of the 
need for capital’s uninterrupted expansion. Even if the basis for capitalism in 
the West has shifted (towards an unequal service-sector economy driven by 
financialization), it is only sustainable by shifting production towards the 
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periphery. Even if manufacturing has declined as a share of the economy in the 
West (here meaning the highly developed countries of Europe and North 
America), production still occurs, and often in areas with much weaker 
environmental regulations. 
 I am inclined toward believing in the value of democracy8 as a governing 
system. I believe that rule by the people is not only the most ethical political 
arrangement but also tends to produce the best outcomes, especially in 
relations to environmental matters. This is because democracy is the only 
system that is able to build the durable consensus necessary to get individuals 
on board with sacrificing material prosperity for the larger good. This is 
especially true on environmental issues.  “Only a democratic system can 
sensitively attend to the conflicts within and among nations and communities, 
decide between different policies, and generally advance the aspirations of 
different segments of the population.”9  Popular democracy legitimizes state 
actions by helping people find their voices and feel that their voices are heard 
by government. Citizen deliberation and debate over public issues is essential 
to an effective polity.10 
 As an outgrowth of capitalism, neoliberalism is responsible for the 
decline of democracy in the United States and impending ecological disaster. 
Global neoliberal capitalism generates climate change, resource depletion, 
biodiversity loss, and a whole host of other ecological troubles.11 At the same 
time, it damages our ability to speak democratically to each other by eroding 
the conduits of democratic life, elevating the grammar of cost-benefit analysis 
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over public good and literally language itself.12 No practical solution to climate 
change fails to take capitalism as the root cause of the problem, and the same 
is coming to hold for democracy. It is capitalism or us. The irony is that 
although criticisms of capitalism are frequently tarred as utopian or 
unrealistic, allowing a system that has put human civilization on a collision 
course with the environment to continue is hopelessly impractical. 
 Opposition to continuing domination of our lives by capitalism has 
become a position linked to the political Left.  Due to the ecological problems 
cited previously, the next few years will be critical to determining the course of 
the next century. This is why thinking hard about how to translate principles 
into policies is essential. To such needed discussions, this essay contributes an 
analysis of Sheldon Wolin’s important call to defend democracy. I focus on the 
opening notes from his journal democracy to discuss how badly maligned the 
public sphere has become. I criticize Wolin’s faith in localism as unresponsive 
to climate change. Then I defend the state as needed to stop humanity’s 
catastrophic course by nationalizing the fossil fuel industry. This is because I 
aim to provide a useful document from the perspective of both activists and 
academics, which in turn requires an actionable proposal attached to 
theorizing. 
II. A Note on Non-Ideal Theory 
 Each paper is itself attempting to model what a theory or argument 
should look like. This model includes: what facts can be assumed, what the 
Jackson 7 
 
endpoint of the analysis is, and what ought to be considered a persuasive 
argument. 
 One question that should be a preliminary component of any discussion 
in political theory is what relationship a proposal or analysis has to ideal 
theory. I am persuaded that the best way to characterize the divide between 
ideal and non-ideal theory from Colin Farrelly as ultimately amounting to the 
degree of fact sensitivity a theory must take on. 13At one extreme would be one 
who believes that a vision of justice is and ought to be separate of non-ideal 
facts. The New Jerusalem, in other words, would need no concern for what the 
world as it is looks like, or what barrier that exist to its implementation. 
 There is value to both ideal and non-ideal theory. It is a necessary 
prerequisite to think about what we want as our endpoint before how to get 
there. I am much more skeptical about taking any strong level of certainty that 
we have successfully established what is wrong in society the way many more 
critically-oriented philosopher are. The wide divide across the West (and the 
world more broadly) should lead us to the conclusion that no major consensus 
exists on what constitutes good or bad behavior, whether for individuals or 
governments. Doubtlessly this is to some degree from bad faith (this seems 
most apparent in the case of global inequality as Westerners will never consent 
to giving up their substantially higher standards of living) and ideological 
conditioning that allow people to ignore very marked problems, but it also 
points to some unanswered fundamental questions. The most obvious example 
being our relationship to the state: many liberals call for big government but 
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are skeptical about emphasizing border protection to deal with illegal 
immigration as conservatives remain both patriotic and raise no major 
objection to global capitalism and its weakening of borders. The point here is 
that we still require more thinking. 
 While this is a paper connected to questions of the state and politics 
more broadly, its more fundamental interest is not prescribing the ideal 
government form or how society should demarcate power. The relatively more 
valuable practice may normally be ideal theory, but the intimately political 
nature of climate change requires theorists to devote their attention uniquely to 
how to craft political solutions to the problem. It is true that the major impacts 
to global governance will not arrive for a long time, but priority should not be 
based on how long it will be until they arrive. Rather, the concern is how much 
time we have until we can no longer address the problem successfully. This 
makes the issue of warming distinct from other existential threats such as 
nuclear war or disease. They each are outside of our ability to control risk in a 
much more fundamental way than climate change. 
 The nature of the threat as a primarily political one alongside the 
enormous impacts it can have should alone be enough to draw the attention of 
political theorists to our ability to speak democratically to each other.  An ideal 
theory would be more in line with political philosophy as understood in the 
philosophy discipline, and non-ideal theory with political theory. This isn’t a 
description of how it operates right now.  Rather it evokes what the ideal 
society would look like and how to remedy the vast problems in our world. 
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III. Wolin 
 Why focus on Wolin? Why not one of the mainstream liberals of the 
times? Why not one of the conservatives later in ascendance? And if a Leftist, 
why not a trendier Marxian, Foucauldian, or Derridean? Wolin’s insightful 
work explores links between popular politics and participatory democracy. 
 Sheldon Wolin was a guiding light of political theory in the second half of 
the twentieth century. From John Rawls to Wendy Brown, Wolin joined the 
ranks of people who have raised the profile of political theory in the media and 
kept the field from failing into obscurity as had been predicted for recent 
decades.14 From the 1960s onward, Wolin’s public profile has been high, and 
his contributions to the field through writings and students have been clearly 
visible. 
 A mid-life high point was the journal democracy, founded in 1981. It 
lasted only until 1983, but its roster of excellent writers, its influence in policy 
circles, and its fusion of theory and practice deserve our attention even today.  
 A further reason to focus on Wolin, and especially his journal for a more 
practical political theory, is that 1981-1983 were the first years of the Ronald 
Reagan presidency. Their perspectives invite comparison to the views available 
to us in the immediate aftermath of the 2016 election that leads into the first 
years of the Donald Trump presidency. 
 Many things can be said about the 2016 election. One is that Trump 
voters revolted against elites. A candidate won with no experience in 
government and challenged the elite cosmopolitan orthodoxy on key issues 
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(immigration, trade, environment, intelligence, manners, etc.) and won in both 
substantive and symbolic ways. From globalization to global warming, elite 
consensus has been rejected by a large swath of the American population, and 
rejected with extremely crude gestures. Can the election of a billionaire signal 
“the twilight of the elites?”15 Trump presented his candidacy as a repudiation of 
American elites, and structured his candidacy to be an object on which his 
supports could project their own desires. An image of tough talk, grit, tenacity 
and sharp elbows, allowed his supports to embrace him in exactly those terms. 
His campaign speeches centered opposition to free trade and critiques of 
deindustrialization alongside calls to build a massive border wall, positioning 
him squarely as an economic nationalist. His public pride in receiving the votes 
of the least-educated voters, seen by many on the left as a sign of his 
brazenness in insulting the intelligence of his supporters, was better read as 
publically signaling that he didn’t think that intelligence was the only thing 
that mattered in order to participate in public life. This disconnect between 
how Trump was read by media elites and his actual supports was effectively 
summed up by billionaire Peter Thiel in that the media took his candidacy and 
words literally, but not seriously. Voters, on the other hand, took his words 
seriously but not literally.16 
 To see how to respond to the election of an alarmingly right-wing 
president, we do well to heed a theorist concerned with participation in public 
life and a broadened public sphere. Wolin addressed how we Americans ought 
to orient ourselves towards a right-wing state and raised a few very key 
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question on what counter-movements might do to maximize their effectiveness 
and what conditions enable democracy to grow. 
 Many are treating the election of Donald Trump ahistorically, as a unique 
break in history, an Event.17 Looking to Wolin’s response to the election of 
Reagan can counter that mistake, reminding us to learn what we can from 
what has come before. It is likely to temper some of the Left’s worries about 
trump and exacerbate others. But especially it can suggest practical responses. 
 Beyond historical parallels as provocative facts or guides to action, there 
are emotional reasons for communing with people facing past troubles, 
different, better eras, if only because the polity seemed to have survived them. 
Part of the enjoyment from reading a journal from 1981 is the feeling that 
things weren’t as bad, that modernity had not steamrolled traditional cultures 
or neoliberalism had not fully entangled the west in its spell, or that the real 
had not been fully consumed. Political hope, or hope to be political, was not yet 
a bad joke. Raiding the archives is a useful way of undermining one of the key 
tenants of the system as it currently constitutes itself-: that there is no 
practical alternative, because there is no viable grammar of public life. Wolin 
provided such an alternative: 
An historical and theoretical understanding has, we believe, not only 
intellectual merits but real political implications. At this moment in the 
historical development of a capitalist civilization in America-including 
under “civilization” not only the economy, but politics, state organization, 
technology, and organized or “big science” – the crucial challenge to 
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radical democracy is to be as zealous in preventing things of great 
value to democracy from passing into oblivion as in bringing into 
the world new political forms of action, participation, and being 
together in the world. Radicals need to cultivate a remembrance of 
things past for in the capitalist civilization, which Schumpeter saw as 
based upon the principle of “creative destruction,” memory is a 
subversive weapon. The ideology of progress fostered by science and 
capitalism depends upon the steady elimination of historical 
consciousness and of the customs, sensibilities, and textures of 
everyday life nourished by that consciousness; just as it depends 
upon the emasculation of the critical function of theory. What is at stake 
simultaneously is the past and the future. Radicals cannot leave the 
past to the conservatives; they need to remind themselves that they, 
too, have a past rich with democratic experience and wisdom, and that 
the arts of conservation have as much to do with learning how to live. 
With the past as with learning how to live within nature and with other 
human beings. The subtitle of democracy states our highest aim: renewal 
and radical change.18 (Bold added) 
 There are two distinct, though interconnected, arguments in this passage 
that are worth being attentive to. The first is that, to Wolin, the past is littered 
with moments, memories, symbols, and movements that are of vital importance 
to the success of radical democracy. The reason for this, and the second 
argument being flagged, is that memory is a subversive tool because the axis of 
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elements hostile to popular democracy (capital and technocratic science) rely 
on the erasure of our historical memories. Recall that this emphasis on the role 
of subject creation was noted by Wendy Brown’s formulation of neoliberalism. 
We rely on the past to evaluate the present and be reminded that nothing is 
inevitable. The hopelessness many feel in the present is all the more 
destabilizing in the absence of historical memory. 
 Let’s be clear-this came out in 1981. The conservative tendencies 
apparent in the Trump era have been around since at least the 1960’s and the 
Goldwater campaign. The quality of American democracy has only gotten worse 
since then. One measurement of this could be voter turnout in midterm 
elections, which have seen decreasing numbers relative to the 1960s.19 Lest 
there be any thought that such a claim lacks any empirical validity, upcoming 
research makes essentially the same point: the warning lights are flashing red 
as democracy declines across the globe.20 
 There is a valid criticism that claiming that capitalism is stable or lacks 
internal contradiction is disempowering and saps people of the motivation to 
challenge the system.21 There are of course many forms of instability that run 
through the system-but any honest assessment of the state of global politics 
will admit that there appears no base able to take power across national 
capitals, much less make the sorts of transnational linkages that the state will 
have to engage in to respond effectively to the international nature of 
contemporary capital. The weakness of European social democracy is widely 
recognized,22 and no expressly anti-capitalist left alternative is in a position of 
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strength to propose a different system. Even in Greece, where voters elected 
and re-elected an expressly leftist government after experiencing the horrors of 
austerity in the neoliberal era, the government ultimately capitulated to capital 
with so little fight that Slavoj Žižek compared to the Theater of the Absurd.23 
 All this is to say that, when surveying the terrain of international politics, 
the present seems to be a very grim place indeed, with the state either 
drastically weakened in its capacity to confront international capital (whether 
that takes the form of fossil fuel or financial firms) or directly controlled by it. 
This is a pressing problem, and it demands we raid the archive of democratic 
theory to see where to turn.  Considering that the interests of capital are in the 
exact opposite direction of ours, and the power of the state is out of our grasp, 
we need to raid the archive of democratic theory to see where instead our 
moments of contestation should arise. 
 Here I glean Wolin’s arguments from the 1981 democracy articles written 
expressly by Wolin. These include his editorials at the front of each issue, his 
notes on each theme, and his stand-alone essays. I also include the second 
edition of Wolin’s classic Politics and Vision, with special attention to the last 
chapter on postmodern democracy. It features his most succinct alternative to 
the hegemony of neoliberal power. Wolin provided a practical, democratic 
strategy of participatory resistance that we do well to pursue as a response to 
the time of Trump. 
 As Wolin himself argued, historical remembrance has power. Rummaging 
through the archives of the earlier fights for justice from the postwar era can 
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help inform our responses. The first issue of democracy had an especially apt 
theme: “Crisis.”  America’s lurch to the right took the form of a hard-right actor 
who railed against environmentalism, social liberalism, and American 
weakness abroad. 
 This tension in the current moment’s historical positioning has been 
especially noted this year. One historian of the conservative movement, Rick 
Perlstein, found himself deluded with “wave after wave of tweets, Facebook 
mentions, and appreciative emails thanking [him] for helping them see how 
this presidential election is ‘just like’ 1968. Or 1972. Or 1964. Or 1976. 
(Though it can’t be “just like” all of them, can it?)”24 
 Judge for yourself how close Wolin’s description of 1981 fits 2016: 
“Elections, supposedly the grand expression of the will of the people, are 
becoming more like rituals of despair in which the voters heap their scorn and 
embarrassment upon the national institutions of Congress and the 
presidency.”25  Thus, the early 1980s seems more directly applicable to the 
time of Trump, for a variety of reasons argued previously. Worries about 
American weakness abroad, economic insecurity, the election of a candidate on 
the right against a technocratic Democrat. The question becomes, then, what 
to do about the situation going forward. 
 It is interesting that Wolin begins his framing of the concept of crisis by 
criticizing the overuse of the term. He blames both media (television especially) 
and government officials for the term being attached to any societal concern 
and ultimately leading to the trivialization of serious issues. He argues that the 
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packaged nature of reporting on crisis inverts the traditional understanding26 
of crisis as a symptom of a broader disorder of the body towards 
comprehending it as a discrete illness, something to be understood in the 
language of those affected and the experts whose remedies will inevitably be 
called on to fix it. This managerialism is alleged to have constricted the realm 
of subjects which citizenship, rather than specialized knowledge, was a 
minimum criteria and helped to contribute to the marginalization of the public 
sphere. 
 As is always the case, things are a little bit more complicated now. TV’s 
power has diminished as people rely increasingly on the Internet for news,27 
This change in viewing habits led to the explosion of professional fact-checkers 
and longer-form policy-centric sites like Vox,28 suggest that the drive for 
experts to cut through the noise of political discourse has not diminished. Who 
could resist expertly-curated publications that put out content like “How 
America became a superpower, explained in 8 minutes?”29  The rhetoric of the 
newly-invigorated class of professional consensus-creators who supposedly 
research questions of recent public controversy and come up with the 
unvarnished truth is usually in the form of short, declarative sentences that 
suggest definitive conclusions, like the one given above. They are the product of 
a technocratic society which would prefer to leave debate over truth to 
professionals rather than making them issues of public deliberation. They are 
the result of outsourcing our community concerns. 
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 Moreover, it appears that the internet has incentivized many to share 
their opinions, whether through Buzzfeed community articles, individual 
Tumblr accounts, The Odyssey Online, Puckermob, Medium, or any of the 
whole host of websites that have minimal requirements for being a published 
writer. Such minimal costs of entry have led to the proliferation of forums for 
ordinary individuals to make their voices heard. The content might be terrible, 
the reach might be small, but these new media put in doubt Wolin’s consistent 
assertion that the media functioned as one of many fundamentally 
antidemocratic institutions. The key distinction between traditional forms of 
media and social media is the level of interactivity they allow. This is why a 
substantial amount of research concludes that social media improves the 
functioning of democracy by allowing for new channels of dialogue to develop 
between citizens. New forms of media have been extremely useful as a tool for 
activists to mobilize and get their message out, especially in less democratic 
societies.30 It is also why the world’s authoritarian governments are so 
desperate to decrease access to it.31 
 This becomes a problem for Wolin’s articulation of the nature of crisis 
insofar as it indicts the way we react to a crisis. Whereas he suggests that the 
packaged presentation of news events lends itself to disconnecting specific 
problems from their roots in broader societal issues, we see just the opposite 
phenomena as everything is tied back to society. For instance, the summer of 
2016 saw debates on whether the mobile videogame Pokémon GO would lead 
to instances of racism against minorities due to broader social inequalities.32 It 
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is quite hard to find cultural phenomenon or political issues these days that do 
NOT get tied to some social illness. The feminist mantra of “the personal is 
political” was picked up by the tastemakers in elite institutions, and they bring 
such a mindset into their work. Just as we see mass depoliticization at the 
macro-level, we see hyperpoliticization at the micro. This has favored tactics 
such as call-out culture and ideologies centered on identity which have less 
emphasis on finding commonality with disparate peoples. This is one way that 
Wolin’s work are limited in their applicability to today, as now, more than ever, 
people have the tools to make their voices heard. Whereas Wolin was concerned 
with the depoliticizing effect that relying on experts would have, and specifically 
that it would lead to apathy stemming from the belief that societal problems 
are too complex for individual citizens to weigh in on, the situation is now that 
people are choosing to make their voices heard. 
 Still, this is not an unconditionally good thing. Online political culture is 
filled with trash, with memes as warrants and hurt feelings trumping falsifiable 
data. But no matter my problems with the content of the discussions, they are 
happening, and are increasingly accessible to people previously voiceless. The 
explosion of commentary from all fronts in the wake of the 2016 election also 
empirically denies the claim that this could lead to voices being drowned out. 
Experts got such a rude awakening on November 8th that many took them to 
task, justifiably or not, for their confidence in predicting the election.33 
Confidence in elites is now the lowest it has been in decades.34 Wolin is simply 
not correct in the current context. 
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 However, Wolin’s understanding of crisis is strikingly applicable to today. 
He defines the difference between a true crisis and “pseudo-crisis” as an event 
that: 
concerns the basic presuppositions that determine who is to take 
decisions in the name of the society; how they come to have that 
authority; what standards of common well-being are to be binding on 
authorities; and what kind of people and society are supposed to be 
nurtured over the long pull. A genuine crisis appears when the 
presuppositions on which the society has based its existence and worked 
out its history for a fairly long time become incompatible, even 
contradictory. But these presuppositions were not themselves the work 
of yesterday or the discovery of the most recent issue of Business Week. 
A true crisis extends to the deep structure of historical existence. A crisis 
is not something that is but a condition that becomes. It is a gathering of 
the past and the present crystallized into opposing forces and ideas.35 
 That Donald Trump represents a repudiation of the very nature of 
status-quo politics is widely acknowledged. The number of news stories 
framing his election as a triumph over the establishment, whether in the form 
of the Republican hierarchy, news media, social elites, or otherwise is 
overwhelming. His pledge immediately after the election to “drain the swamp” 
in Washington D.C. was an explicit claim that he meant to upend 
contemporary norms of doing politics, starting with who was in office. His 
aesthetic and discourse played precisely into the questioning of elites 
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(ironically) aligned perfectly with what a large part of the country felt. The 
conclusion must be that such a feeling had been present for a long time, was 
felt with increasingly intensity and culminated in the ultimate middle-finger: 
the election of a candidate with the least experience in government in modern 
memory. It was an undercurrent that has existed for some time, not something 
that was manufactured or only recently erupted. The major political forces of 
the Left, to the extent that they still exist, have widely endorsed a technocratic, 
expert-driven agenda. The most potent example of how this has negatively 
affected the working class and contributed to the rise of Trump is free trade, an 
especially salient issue for him to capitalize on. This was further incentivized by 
the shift in the Democratic Party towards trying to capture white-collar 
professional voters, who backed free trade and globalization more generally.36 
The problem is that a theory of democratic life is an essential prerequisite to 
those same policy fixes insofar as they are only possible by an active citizenry 
who feel they can actually engage in public life. Wolin’s concluding paragraph 
on the nature of crisis is strikingly prescient for the current moment: “the 
question is posed of why we, as a society, have thought so little and so badly 
about how a democratic people can get itself (or selves) together and act in 
democratic ways.”37 In order to take back the public sphere, we must engage in 
just such a conversation. 
 Why is the focus on democracy so important? Wolin argued in the 
opening pages that the fundamental fact in American political life is the 
increasingly undemocratic nature of our institutions.38 Strengthened by 
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hierarchical organizational structures that are entirely unaccountable to 
outsiders, these institutions marginalize politics to managerialism and 
concentrate powers in those able to access the institutions. He links these 
processes to the decline of the effectiveness of political parties and their ability 
to effectively mobilize voters towards a common agenda. The catastrophic 
status of the Democratic Party and its failure to mobilize the white working 
class or at least offer convincing reasons to not vote for a conservative outsider 
is plausibly due to just this process.39 What Wolin identifies as the process of 
marginalization is even more convincing in 2016 than in 1981. It can only have 
gotten worse as expectations of politics dwindled. It was precisely the 
otherworldliness of Bernie Sander’s message of economic justice, with its 
transparently reformist agenda that was perceived as radical that showed how 
generally minimal is expected of politics these days. This is the same point 
made by Slavoj Žižek when he quips that the success of disaster movies proves 
that it is easier for most people to imagine the end of the world than the end of 
capitalism. 
 Wolin argued that the focus on economic and technological progress 
distracted from the regressive trends in society, and that this has led to us 
“evolving from a more to a less democratic polity and from a less to a more 
authoritarian society. These tendencies define the meaning of the present as 
the moment in our national history when democracy is forced into 
opposition.”40 The Trump phenomenon seems like just the sort of thing that 
signals a shift towards a more authoritarian society. His actions in office have 
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been roundly and persuasively interpreted as broadly authoritarian,41 but 
social science research indicates that his voters are not.42 
 However, I do not think that the election of Donald Trump represents a 
turn away from democracy. Quite the contrary, insofar as it represented a 
rejection of faraway elites and their cultural preferences, it implies just the 
opposite-that people are so fed up with the status quo’s perceived rules of 
operation that they are willing to go to extreme lengths to make their 
unhappiness known. His election has forced a great deal of reflection as to 
what went wrong, why people are so unhappy, and what to do about it. 
 Wolin was responding to a historical moment that he took to spotlight 
the powerlessness of America. At the time this was in the form of the Iran 
hostage crisis, dependence on foreign oil, the decline of American global 
hegemony, the weakness of President Carter’s response to the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan. For Wolin these contributed to an American crisis in our 
identity as a polity and as a people. Those same questions are being raised 
now. The Presidency of Donald Trump questions who Americans are and what 
they value. Are we racist, sexist, and xenophobic? 
 No, not overall. While there are racist elements in American society, the 
borderline universal revilement of explicitly racist public statement suggests 
that Americans are at least unwilling to back such positions. That our schools 
revere the Civil Rights movement, teach history as an ever-expanding march 
towards progress and equality, also reflects societal values that, however 
imperfect, prioritize legal equity. There is, moreover, a tradition within (yet 
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critical of) American life running from the early Quakers through the radical 
abolitionists and the Populists and Prairie radicals that refused the 
exclusionary practices of the dominant political forces and elites towards racial 
minorities and indigenous people. Major segments of the American population 
opposed imperialism, racial discrimination, the expansion of neoliberalism, and 
each attempt at expansion of elite control. To me this means that oppression is 
not inherently American, or Western, or liberal. It must always be stressed that 
virtually all instances of objectionable policies have been opposed by at least 
some portion of America. 
 So when we speak about the legacies of slavery, we must keep in mind 
the John Browns who objected relentlessly. Iowa, for instance, had the highest 
percentage of its male population serve in the armed forces of any state during 
the Civil War. The point is that white people are not ontologically antagonistic 
and that there has always been a contingency of American society that has 
objected at every step of the genocidal process of colonization, racialization, 
and political exclusion. To think otherwise is to accept the capitalist notion 
that politics is useless and concede that violent racial relations are inevitable. 
 This has some significance when it comes to how we do politics from now 
on. I do not think that the election of Donald Trump shows any great darkness 
in the American character. Many Trump voters preferred him for outrageous 
statements not because of their (sometime racist) content but because of their 
politically incorrect form. They did not agree with his specifics but appreciated 
him in general for “going there.” Most people didn’t approve of his attacks on 
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the background of a federal judge, nor his ill-considered representations of 
immigrants, but his excess was seen as subverting contemporary political 
norms rather than disqualifying.  If the Left thinks anything else, it is left with 
two bad paths. Either America is irreversibly racist, at the core of its being, so 
that politics are worthless and we might as well give, or Trump voters cannot 
be persuaded and must be pitted against a combination of sympathetic whites 
and minority groups. Neither approach offers a successful future, and would 
contribute to the further breakdown of the political process. It is a dead end. 
This balkanization will fail because, as Wolin wrote in his seminal 1994 essay 
on fugitive democracy, “homogeneity was not then and need not now be 
equated with dreary uniformity, any more than equality need be mere levelling. 
What it does require is understanding what is truly at stake politically: 
Heterogeneity, diversity, multiple selves are no match for modern forms of 
power.”43  Bottom line, we cannot give up on democracy. 
IV. The Luxury of Localism and the State of Climate Change 
 Beyond vague references to a return to democracy and a focus on 
crafting political identities, Wolin doesn’t discuss strategy in practical terms.  
But he does focus on the centralization of power from the Articles of 
Confederation into the 1950s. He saw the new social movements of the 1960s 
as an effort to forward a more inclusive view of citizenship through 
emphasizing the more democratic elements of the American Revolution. Yet he 
argued that their political weakness was exposed and repudiated by the re-
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election of Richard Nixon in 1972, over the clearest signifier of the new politics, 
George McGovern. 
 Wolin’s most clearly articulated strategy comes in the concluding chapter 
of his magnum opus, Politics and Vision. He claims that the remnants of 
democratic life can only be found in the currently operating centrifugal forces 
“away from inclusive commonality…an accompanying emphasis on 
difference.”44 The current iteration of this would likely be groups such as Black 
Lives Matter and other identity politics groups. They have had remarkable 
staying power in crafting political identities outside of commonly shared 
notions of citizenship. But as he wrote back in 1994, they are no match for 
current forms of state power. A group defining itself by its distinction (or 
characteristics that render it distinct) from the broader polity will find it very 
hard to convince people without similar affiliations to care about their needs. 
Moreover, the form of diversity-based identity politics is easily assimilated into 
broader economic structures because demands couched in such terms are 
easily to implement without changing the underlying structure of exclusion. 
This cultural cooption of identity is most clearly apparent in the recent choice 
by Pepsi to focus their most recent ad campaign on images of protesters 
sharing a can of soda with police, all while holding up generic protest signs. 
While the campaign came under enormous criticism for precisely this 
monetizing of protest, it should come as no surprise that ad agencies have 
concluded that evoking social change is a winning strategy to capture 
consumer dollars.45 Another instance of this is the rise of corporate feminism. 
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For example, the female C.E.O. of Yahoo who banned working from home and 
refused to expand opportunities for childcare built a nursery next to her 
office.46 
 Instead, Wolin proposed that we turn towards the local to learn again to 
do democratic politics. We should engage local political life through school 
boards, city councils, and the like because “small scale is the only scale 
commensurate with the kind and amount of power that democracy is capable 
of mobilizing, given the political limitations imposed by prevailing modes of 
economic organization.”47 Modest sites under local control can, according to 
Wolin, become schools of democracy. They can enable us to relearn how to 
deliberate, and generate alternative arrangements of social life. Wolin 
suggested that they will also eliminate the tendency toward professionalization 
of interests in representative democracy.48 
 Wolin’s work is strongest in explaining needs and describing processes 
for practical alternatives to the status quo, but he does provide an eloquent 
summation of a method for reinvigorating democratic politics. But my aim 
argument is that Wolin’s prescription is strikingly wrong, and must be rejected. 
Localism is for us an unacceptable strategy for democracy. To say why is to 
provide a positive defense of the national state, democratizing it as best as we 
can. 
 As a preliminary point, the emphasis on local spaces of deliberation does 
not fully eliminate the sorts of hierarchical politics that many proponents wish 
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to avoid. The sorts of institutions that Wolin cites as nurseries for democratic 
politics, such as school boards, maintain hierarchies. 
 The first major objection is that, contrary to Wolin’s claim that the more 
intimate setting will act as a bulwark against the power of capital, it is actually 
a much worse beachhead. It should come as no surprise that the risk of 
regulatory capture increases as the size of the institution decreases, especially 
on environmental issues.49 Localities do not have the resources or institutional 
power to challenge neoliberalism either regionally, nationally, or globally. Local 
governments don’t have the economic resources or scale to match that of 
capital. Radicals will be outgunned on the ground and swatted down by state 
and federal pre-emption. And there is no articulation of how movements 
centered on localities will link up to sympathizers elsewhere. Politics that 
attach an especially strong weight to cultivating ties centered on locality would 
necessarily have a harder time establishing connections beyond where their 
interests lie. If the primary source of our political and social allegiance is local, 
there is a tradeoff with other allegiances. This is what led to the centralization 
of power primarily defining the transition from the Articles of Confederation to 
our modern Constitution. 
 Localities are especially weak at protecting the rights of minority groups, 
as evidenced by the long reign of yellow-dog Democrats in the south and their 
suffocating of citizenship for those who did not look or act like them. The petty 
little feuds of the county seat bosses is much harder to counteract without 
federal intervention. It might be nice to envision town-hall style democracy 
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from sea to shining sea, but that is at best a long-term goal, not an effective 
response to the status quo. Revolutionaries cannot wish away existing power 
structures or policy dilemmas, they must craft alternatives that at minimum 
use power as they find it towards other ends. And they must make a 
justification for whether the extra time necessary to have their vision of society 
implemented and effective is justified in light of pressing ecological concerns. 
 Wolin, like other advocates for localism, has no strategy for scaling local 
institutions or experiences up to the national and international levels. This 
should leave us skeptical of their ability to solve pressing problems. Some of 
the more contemporary examples of localized politics (BLM, Occupy, the 
academic left in the universities) show that only movements which use the 
language of the national state and overate through its accountable political 
channels have even a prayer of actualizing their demands. None have been able 
to effectively change policy or scale up what policies they called for. They have 
been effective in the culture wars, most notably relating to same-sex marriage, 
but it was ultimately instituted legally by judicial fiat, not legislative acts. 
Cultural coercion will be required to get more regressive regions on board. All 
this points to the fact that the one significant victory the cultural left has had 
in recent years came about through the legal system and that it short-circuited 
the sorts of national deliberation and debate necessary to get disparate people 
onboard.  Nonetheless, it is also true that corporations much prefer dealing 
with smaller localities because of the mismatch of power and resources. 
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 Especially we lack time to engage in localist experiments in a world 
where top climate scientists show that we need drastic emissions cut in the 
next few years to stave off the two-degree rise in emissions that will trigger 
catastrophic feedback loops.50 
 So, to summarize, we do not have the time, localities are a uniquely bad 
site to fight, and there is an unacceptable risk of the exclusion of minorities. 
 We must instead be trying to take back the state. The fundamental claim 
of this essay is that no matter the validity of localism otherwise, Wolin and 
other localists are wrong specifically when confronting the threat of radical 
change in climate. We need the state, organized beyond the local level, to 
effectively coordinate our actions and cultivate our technical abilities to 
address climate change. This is to say that while democracy is a good thing 
and is probably the system of governance most amenable the long-term 
consensus-building necessary to address climate change,51 the state is a 
necessity. If (temporarily) accepting an unjust social order is necessary to stave 
off planetary catastrophe, so be it. To re-appropriate a rather disgusting right-
wing slogan, there is no alternative. 
 There are several defenses of the state. It can be remarkable force for 
positive social change.52 It is also the singular major institution left that has 
even a chance of matching the clout of capital because although the relative 
power of national governments to regulate industry has declined, the 
fundamental coercive power remains. Governments can (and have) coordinate 
policies to limit multinational corporation’s ability to circumvent regulations. 
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 Now is not the time for anti-statist rhetoric. The nature of climate change 
requires that the vast power of Leviathan to command and coordinate human 
activity be repurposed towards ecologically sustainable ends. The opposition 
many on the left harbor towards the state is hideously flawed. Although the 
threat of movement cooption is a real one,53 the simple fact is that there is no 
other institution with the capacity to address systemic problems like climate 
change. In light of what little time remains to confront environmental problems 
with a modicum of faith in our ability to succeed, we should privilege political 
tactics that will most likely allow us to take back state power. 
 And even if there was a non-state entity that could act, it likely wouldn’t 
have the democratic component that makes the government more responsive to 
the public. Individuals often become overwhelmed by news of climate change 
and a pessimism that is politically fatal sets in. The antidote to the poison of 
pessimism is hope in popular sovereignty. Too often we forget that by law we 
could elect a Congress full of Ralph Nader’s if we wanted. Make the bastards 
either reject popular democracy or implement the laws necessary to ward off 
climate change. 
 Yet is not necessary to prove that the state is a good thing in order to 
justify state action to deal with climate change. The alternative is market-
driven reforms. The most obvious example is cap-and-trade. Although it is a 
government-run program, it quite literally commodifies carbon and uses 
capitalistic mechanisms to address what is at its root a problem of capitalism. 
Chasing our own tail, anyone? 
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 Neoliberalism is the governing ideology of public policy. It should come as 
no surprise then that the policies crafted to respond to climate change have 
tended to make the assumption of markets as a good thing and proceeded from 
there.54 
 It should be said that there are a number of good things about such a 
policy. Assuming accurate oversight of industry emissions and a cap influenced 
by the best of climate science, it assures that emissions will not rise above a 
dangerous level. But it also promotes an exceptionally pernicious form of 
climate colonialism whereby governments allow businesses to create “offsets,” 
or provable decreases in a firm’s emissions. These offsets can be used to 
decrease the number of emissions permits needed. 
 Although that may sound like a good thing, it tends to overwhelmingly 
occur due to corporate-funded deforestation of the global South, cutting old-
growth forests and planting new trees, which can be used as offsets. This 
displaces indigenous and poor people as the West finds new and creative ways 
to hurt the people least responsible and most affected by our own mess. This 
helps reinforce existing inequalities and unequal power relations.55 
 The choice, then, is between state-centric solutions or those of the 
market. We should listen to our enemies on this point-they have been making 
sure they can influence national government policy as much as possible. 
Industry takes the power of the state to regulate very seriously. 
 Last, huge, high-profile moves by the government can help reignite 
people’s imaginations and help them realize that public action is possible. 
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From Star Trek to the originally enthusiastic response to Roosevelts N.R.A., 
there is precedent for the public responding to mass mobilization of society 
towards a common goal. Only broad state policies can remind people what sort 
of power they share. 
V. Points of Contestation 
 If our goal is to reignite the public’s faith in democracy, we need to think 
big. At the same time, the urgent need for action on climate change (and the 
fact that it allows us to highlight one of the most damaging outgrowths of 
capitalism) requires us to use the state. In this section I will discuss some 
possible policies meant to mitigate carbon emissions. It will focus on a proposal 
left out of most debates-nationalization. 
 If we rule out cap-and-trade, we are left with essentially two options. The 
first is a tax on carbon emissions. As suspicious as we should be about a policy 
publically supported by Exxon-Mobil, it has won accolades in all corners, from 
a roster of neoliberal economists to Naomi Klein. It can be designed to be 
strongly redistributive (through rebates to households made worse off by 
increased costs), a net-plus for the economy (via a tax swap with the corporate 
income tax), or used to fund green technology. It can sound like a win-win 
proposition. 
 Yet there are several reasons why carbon taxes should not be our 
priority. For one thing, it is exceedingly hard to nail the true “cost” of 
something like biodiversity loss and the destabilization of the climate. It is 
likely that we will shoot too low. Speaking the language of taxes and costs is all 
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too easily weaponized by the Right. It also can’t guarantee that emissions will 
be sent sufficiently downward in time, because there is no statutory cap on 
emissions. It simply is too risky an option. 
 Market-based solutions focus on incentivizing good behavior through 
effective carbon pricing, and command-and-control policies. Command-and-
control involves direct regulation of private industrial activity through 
governmental fiat. Generally speaking, such policies can be divided into 
performance and technological mandates.56 In the context of climate change, a 
technology mandate would require that companies adopt specific processes, 
such as carbon-capture storage. In contrast, performance mandates would 
merely call for industrial processes to stop short of a specified amount of 
emissions. It does not call for any one technology to get the job done. 
Performance standards can be imagined as applying the cap portion of cap-
and-trade to various activities that contribute to climate change, such as 
manufacturing processes, natural resource extraction, electricity generation, 
etc. 
 The primary benefit of command-and-control policies is their 
effectiveness, especially in a situation where the risks of not effectively 
addressing a problem are high. If something absolutely must get done in a 
short period of time, or when the uncertainty of the severity of an event is high, 
policies that don’t pussyfoot around are to be preferred. In light of the 
numerous scenarios for extinction that climate change might lead us to, it does 
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not seem like a stretch to say we should assign the highest priority to 
mitigation policies with the highest likelihood of being effective. 
 How would command-and-control look in practice? Just to look at cars, 
we already have fuel efficiency standards, CAFÉ standards, and safety 
mandates. Many portions of the Clean Air Act have provisions that function 
like a technology standard by requiring that utilities adopt better practices to 
minimize air quality concerns. Nonetheless, if mandating performance or 
technology requirements is to have anything close to the economy-wide effect of 
a carbon tax in terms of reducing emissions, it would require an enormous 
bureaucracy to coordinate with industry and effectively monitor polluters. The 
sheer size of the intervention into the private sector would be unmatched in the 
history of peacetime America. It would rival the Roosevelt administrations 
A.A.A. and N.R.A. programs in intrusiveness. It would also take time to record 
the status-quo emissions, determine what amount of CO2-equivalent is 
acceptable, and then roll out either the technology necessary to get us there or 
allow the private sector to come up with its own solutions. 
 Beyond simple economic cost concerns, command-and-control standards 
that rely on using technology to curb emissions will likely run into difficulty 
getting emulated internationally. The rollout poses high costs to businesses, 
causing industries in poorer countries to balk all the more. Performance 
standards are more appealing because they incentivize the development of 
more technology, promising cheaper compliance for companies. Still, the issues 
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above make command-and-control policies in general unfit to be the rallying 
cry of the climate justice movement. 
 Another non-market response to climate change has received scant 
attention in the capitalist United States: nationalizing the fossil fuel industry. 
In political science, most studies ask questions such as why countries 
nationalize domestic oil industries and what political effect they have nationally 
or internationally. Many Marxist journals discuss relationships between energy 
and capital. But on this topic, I could only find one piece of disciplinary 
political science in the last two years, and it appeared in an online opinion 
website.57 
 Although nationalization of fossil fuel companies has been discussed 
since the mid-to-late 2000s, when gas prices were high and it seemed apparent 
that the oil industry was bilking the American people, it seems especially 
appropriate for dealing with climate change. There are a number of reasons 
why a government takeover would be a good idea. 
 First, as climate activist Bill McKibben argues persuasively, the math on 
climate change keeps worse. As he wrote in September: 
…last year, when the world’s leaders met in Paris, they set a new 
number: Every effort, they said, would be made to keep the global 
temperature rise to less than 1.5 degrees. And to have even a 50–
50 chance of meeting that goal, we can only release about 353 
gigatons more CO2. So let’s do the math again: 942 > 353. A lot 
greater. To have just a break-even chance of meeting that 1.5 
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degree goal we solemnly set in Paris, we’ll need to close all of the 
coal mines and some of the oil and gas fields we’re currently 
operating long before they’re exhausted.58 
His conclusion is that we must have a managed decline of the coal, oil, and 
natural gas industries. Absent government intervention, the planned 
exploration and drilling projects that the industry has laid out will be 
cataclysmic for the planet. 
 If there is anything that a reader must take away from this discussion, it 
is that the world has no chance of stopping global warming if we don’t stop 
future exploration. In McKibben’s words: 
In the United States alone, the existing mines and oil wells and gas fields 
contain 86 billion tons of carbon emissions—enough to take us 25 
percent of the way to a 1.5 degree rise in global temperature. But if the 
U.S. energy industry gets its way and develops all the oil wells and 
fracking sites that are currently planned, that would add another 51 
billion tons in carbon emissions. And if we let that happen, America 
would single-handedly blow almost 40 percent of the world’s carbon 
budget.59 
The best proof of the idea that zero-percent probabilities can exist is the notion 
that the fossil fuel industry will never, ever, commit suicide. It is a 
metaphysical impossibility. The CEO of Shell will not disassemble their own 
company. Only through immediate seizure of the industry by the federal 
government and implementing strict anti-extraction policies will we be able to 
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wind down the extractive industries in time. Stopping future projects is an 
essential prerequisite to having even a prayer of dealing with climate change. 
 Second, the industry is already dying. Independent oil companies are 
going bankrupt at an incredible rate, divestment pressures are rising, and the 
amount of risk these companies are exposed to is extremely high. We have also 
probably hit peak oil.60 If the likelihood of bankruptcies in the coming decades 
is high, the effects of nationalization on the economy would pale in comparison 
to the effects on financial markets. In the 2016 Forbes Top 500, oil and gas 
companies take the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, tenth, sixteenth, and twentieth 
spots. Fossil fuels are crucial both as a fuel and as a commodity. It powers a 
great deal of our world, but our world will not survive if the oil industry as we 
know it continues. 
 What then for the communities who rely on nonrenewable industries for 
their continued existence? It isn’t hard to argue that keeping a few West 
Virginia towns around isn’t worth cooking the planet, but these are real people 
who can’t just be thrown aside in a mad dash to stave off warming. That would 
replicate the logic of disposability and sacrificial zones that are so 
dehumanizing. But if Ahmed is correct and those industries are already 
terminally in decline, public management of threatened industries is the only 
way to protect local communities. A cascade of bankruptcies will already 
increase public costs through more stress on the social safety net, but this can 
be avoided if the workers are classified as public employees. There is some 
precedence for this. When the French government chose to wind down their 
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domestic coal industry, they provided a greater degree of protection for affected 
communities through decent early retirement packages and shifting workers 
into other state industries so as to avoid job losses. From 1946 until the last 
mine was closed in 2004, the number of job losses was zero.61 
 It is precisely this last part that is key because any policy aimed at 
dealing with climate change will be demonized by the right as an economy-
killing government intervention that will devastate working class people. 
Nationalization seems to hit the sweet spot-it targets an already at-risk 
industry, is the only way to protect those who will be affected by clotures, and 
shows the state can plan effectively for a green future. This is why Bruce 
Lesnick argues that such a policy is uniquely key for galvanizing the climate 
justice movement and avoiding the media narrative surrounding prior anti-
neoliberal movements like Occupy, namely that they lacked concrete demands. 
By focusing the movement on a policy that can actually be implemented by the 
state and that highlights the absurdity of allowing the market system to 
continue, the movement can bring to the attention of the American public the 
need for collective action in the context of climate change and have a chance of 
creating the sort of multilevel, ideally transnational linkages that are crucial to 
effective policy influence. The success of Bernie Sanders in 2016 suggests that 
there really is a yearning for a left-populist alternative. 
 Does this mean that we need to challenge liberal democracy? I don’t 
think so.  The drive towards sustainability is fully compatible with liberal 
democracy insofar as we note a distinction between individual rights to self-
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expression and property rights. I for one am ambivalent on the significance of 
private property to the functioning of a liberal democratic order. 
  So far as some room for personal property is allowed, and the citizenry 
feels included in the decision to appropriate property for the community (and 
trust that the process was fair and for just reasons), the dystopian nightmare 
states of the past can be ignored both as rhetorical tools against the Left and 
as ongoing criticisms. Most Americans probably do have an unusually explicit 
attachment to property rights, but they have been willing to sacrifice them for 
the broader body politic when the stakes are sufficiently high enough. 
VII. Conclusion 
 There is much to be worried about in the world that we find ourselves in. 
War, poverty, ecological destruction, and unequal societal relations are 
problems that we continue to face despite modernity having an almost 
unchallenged global reach. 
 Although left movements have been stymied in Europe and North 
American, there is a growing rejection of elites across national capitals. The 
conclusion we should draw from this is that centrist elitism cannot defeat 
right-wing populism, not that democracy is flawed. 
 As capitalism represents a thread to both our physical and communal 
well-being, it must be broken as soon as possible. Generating innovative 
strategies of resistance alongside targeted actionable policies will help to 
hasten its demise by demonstrating that capitalism is not inevitable. By 
challenging capitalism at its weakest, most unpopular points (such as the oil 
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industry) we can simultaneously demonstrate that public life is worthwhile, the 
state can be effective, and collective action can merit our attention. How to 
rebuild the organizational capacity of the left is an open question, but for now, 
our demands must be as radical as necessary and as practical as possible. 
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